Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts

Friday, April 25, 2008

East Asian Multilateralism: Fukuyama on Chinese democracy

I attended a fantastic event this week at the Japan Society in NYC with Francis Fukuyama and Kent Calder about their new book East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability. Gideon Rose moderated.

One of the take away points that Fukuyama made was on Chinese democracy: It won't come anytime soon. The idea that development will push democracy in China doesn't work, he said. No one knows whether Chinese will accept the notion that the country has to embrace human rights to get what it wants. Fukuyama's concern is that gains from growth in China are so lopsided that democratic representation could mean a redistribution of wealth that would cancel out those gains. In any case, China could become the first country to democratize over the environment "because the are poisoning themselves." But he is optimistic for the long run.

In the book, Fukuyama, Calder, and their coauthors grapple with a changing security environment in East Asia where the traditional hub and spoke system has become outdated. What is dramatically different about the current situation, argues Fukuyama, is "the changed posture of South Korea... South Korea has shifted from being a bastion of anti-communism to seeking reconciliation and ultimate reunification with North Korea." Meanwhile, Korea-China relations have warmed. The South Korean spoke is "slowly rotting away."

To deal with new trends in China, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan, the United States needs to consider a multilateral framework for Asia, beyond the hub and spoke system. As Kent Calder put it, Northeast Asia is under-institutionalized, suffering from an organization gap. The areas of promise for institutionalization include the environment, energy, and finance.

Fukuyama outlined five options in his chapter:

Option one would be to maintain the current bilateral system and oppose multilateral institutions that do not include the United States, as Richard Armitage has argued.

Option two would be to lay the foundations for a multilateral containment barrier against China. He said a "sophisticated version" of this idea is contained in the project I ran at CSIS. In that project, Sherman Katz, Robert Fauver, and I argued for an East Asian economic community that would "incorporate as criteria for membership certain elements of good governance--for instance, rule of law, transparency, government accountability, and so on," as Fukuyama put it. You can read my proposal with Katz for these Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) here from the American Interest.

Option three would be to create a five-power organization based on the six party talks. This is a proposal that Ian Bremmer and many others have proposed. My only critique about this concept is that it not take on too many sectors, as I argued in the National Interest here.

Option four would be to revitalize existing forums such as APEC in which the United States is a member. This is a concept that has been touted by many government officials in public but sometimes scoffed at in private. Many say that APEC is too big to get anything done.

The final option would be "re-Asianize" Japan by taking an existing forum such as ASEAN Plus Three and having Japan engage that forum in a more meaningful way. This idea was pushed by Kazuhiko Togo in the book and seemed to be Fukuyama's preferred route.

Monday, June 25, 2007

Lee Hsien-Loong: ASEAN Needs Charter

Speaking at the 16th World Economic Forum on East Asia in Singapore over the weekend (press release here), Prime Minister Lee Hsien-Loong praised the economic progress made in India, China, Japan, and Korea, but had a more tempered assessment on ASEAN:

"Within Southeast Asia, the picture is mixed. Some countries like Vietnam are pressing ahead with reforms, and are in the early stages of take-off. Others have not restructured their economies and reformed their institutions to the extent that investors had hoped to see. Investment flows have reflected these differences. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia as a whole has regained its balance, and with high energy prices benefiting the oil-exporting economies, the region is moving forward again.

The ASEAN countries realise that they need to strengthen their cooperation with one another in order to stay on the radar screen of international companies and investors. This is why ASEAN is drafting a Charter to strengthen its institutions and define its long-term goals. We are also striving for an ASEAN Community by 2015, to create a single economic entity and realise the full potential of our combined market of 550 million people."

Friday, April 27, 2007

Thoughts on Bush-Abe Meeting

I spoke on Al Jazeera and to the Congressional Quarterly yesterday about the Bush-Abe meetings this week. On the comfort women issue, my basic take is this: Japan should seize the moment to take the moral high ground, not get caught up in cynical short-term political calculations. Shared values is the glue that holds the US and Japan together, and it is what gives the US and Japan legitimacy to lead. Based on the news yesterday, I get the sense that Abe is coming to the same conclusion, despite Japanese diplomats' protestations.

In my view, seizing the moment for Japan would mean: 1. taking responsibility for the recruitment of comfort women and 2. embracing human rights. This is to say Japan should reframe the issue as protecting human rights and responsibility--not about pride and sovereignty. I get the feeling from Japanese press, polls, and friends that this approach would resonate with the public. Japan is thirsty for a moral, visionary leader. Here are some of my comments from the al Jazeera interview:

Q: Perhaps the biggest issue that PM Abe and Pres. Bush will discuss is North Korea. Both countries are partners in an effort to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons- what is Japan’s role? Abe owes much of his popularity to his tough stance on North Korea, but the Japanese view America as being ‘soft’ on NK- especially with the missed deadline to shut down Yongbyon. What kind of strain does this put on their relationship?

I would put the question differently: What is North Korea's role in US-Japan relations? Although the US-Japan alliance is firmly in place for the long run, based on shared values and what I would call contiguous interests, North Korea is somewhat of a thorn in their side. The simple fact is that Bush and Abe are weak leaders who need a foreign policy success and are willing to do a lot to get it. The problem is that the US just wants a deal with North Korea on dismantling its nuclear facilities, while Japan wants a more hard line resolution on the abduction issue. Both of these demands are coming from domestic constituencies in Japan and the US---and that's what happens when foreign policy is made in the context of democracy.

The US is waiting for North Korea to start dismantling its nuclear facilities. And the US is optimistic that North Korea will cooperate and allow inspectors in. What about the US record with comfort women, ask some in the Japanese press? The US is not without guilt. No one has a spotless history. Whether it's fair or not, it is Japan that is under international scrutiny now, not the US.

Q: Is China’s rising economic power a growing concern for Japan?

China just became Japan's biggest trading partner, surpassing the US. And Toyota has just surpassed GM as the largest car maker in terms of sales last quarter. We are starting to see what many people have predicted as the Asian Century. Power is shifting to Asia. Is Japan afraid of China? Absolutely. There is enormous change happening in East Asia in economics, politics, and security, and that is frightening. But China's leaders need a stable economy as much--maybe even more so--as Japan's leaders. While China's political stability is based on economic growth, Japan's is based on democratic legitimacy. Japan's view of China is ambivalent overall: It sees China as a great opportunity with high risk and it sees it as an economic challenge--in terms of intellectual property rights, the environment, energy consumption, and eventually in the manufacturing sector. But this wont really happen until China gets some recognizable brand names. And I give that another 10 to 15 years.


Q: President Bush and PM Abe both are dealing with low popularity, does this make their alliance even more crucial?

Bush and Abe are dealing with low popularity so they will probably want to avoid anything risky during their public appearances during this trip. They need to show that they have friends in the world. The US is Japan's most reliable friend and vice versa. My prediction is that these leaders will re-affirm their commitment to the spread of democracy (the glue in the relationship) and will try to find common ground on areas that everyone agrees on, including cooperating on environmental technologies such as clean coal plants, cooperation in energy conservation (something Japan knows a lot about), and possibly the idea of deeper economic partnership. Japan launched FTA negotiations with Australia recently and US signed an FTA with Korea. Many see these talks as preludes to a deeper US-Japan economic partnership based on shared values.